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PRIVITY, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, AND UCC
WARRANTIES: A RETROSPECT OF AND
PROSPECTS FOR ILLINOIS COMMERCIAL
CODE § 2-318
Our... law cannot hope to survive by stubborn adherence to decisions
written for a different world. We cannot and should not apply seventeenth and eighteenth century rules to twentieth century conditions.'
INTRODUCTION

Commentators often note the overlap between the law of sales
and the law of torts in products liability litigation. 2 However, in
Illinois, the division of products liability into these two fields3 has
created gaps in the law of products liability as a whole. These gaps
leave many injured consumers without a remedy.
This comment explores and seeks to remedy some of the gaps
that the evolution of sales and tort law have created in their erosion
of privity of contract, 4 a common law prerequisite to products liability suits. 5 Part I of this comment discusses the requirement of priv1. Henderson v. Henderson, 169 N.Y.S.2d 106, 115 (1957).
2. Numerous authors have cited the overlap between the law of sales
and the law of torts in the field of products liability. See, eg., RICHARD W.
DuESENBEPGER & LAWRENCE P. KING, SALEs & BULK TRANSFERS UNDER THE

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (MB) § 7.06 [1], at 7-152 to 7-176
(1990) (noting the inherent relationship between strict products liability and
warranty actions); William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (StrictLiability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099,1124-34 (1960) (arguing that warranties reflect the overlap between contract and tort law and that states should
abandon the warranty theory of products liability); Donald J. Rapson, Products
Liability Under ParallelDoctrines: ContrastsBetween the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RUTGERs L REv. 692, 695-704 (1965)

(identifying areas of consistency between strict products liability and warranty
liability under the UCC); Comment, Manufacturers'Liability to Remote Purchasersfor "Economic Loss" Damages - Tort or Contract?,114 U. PA. L. REV.
539, 540 (1966) (noting the theoretical possibility of recovering for economic
losses which defective products cause under either tort or sales law).
3. Dean Prosser was the most notable proponent for furthering this division. Prosser ardently fought to isolate the law of torts as the sole bastion of
products liability. Prosser, supra note 2, at 1124-34.
4. "Privity of contract" is defined as "[t]hat connection or relationship
which exists between two or more contracting parties." BLACK's LAw DICIONARY 1079 (5th ed. 1979). With respect to products liability actions, the contractual relationship is "usually that between the buyer and the seller." AMERICAN
LAw OF PRODUCT LIABILITY § 21:1 (Timothy Travers et al. eds., 3d ed., The Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Co. 1987).
5. See Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
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ity of contract as it existed at common law. 6 Part II analyzes the
subsequent erosion of privity in the law of sales and torts in the
context of both common law and statutory law.7 Part III utilizes
Illinois law to illustrate the judicial misconstruction and gaps which
have resulted from the erosion of the privity requirement in sales
and tort law.8 Finally, Part IV proposes and examines several potential revisions to Illinois Commercial Code § 2-318. 9 Section 2-318
presently provides for a limited extension of Uniform Commercial
Code ("UCC") warranties beyond a product's original buyer to third
party beneficiaries. 10 The proposed revisions would extend express
and implied warranties" to broader classes of third party beneficiaries. Additionally, the proposed revisions would allow the broadened classes to recover for personal injury, property damage, and
direct and consequential economic damages when sellers breach
those warranties. 12 These revisions would functionally remove the
antiquated remnants of the common law privity requirement from
products liability actions brought under UCC warranty theories.
I. THE COMMON LAw PRIVITY REQUIRMENT
To understand the modern formulations of the requirement of
privity of contract, it is first necessary to discuss the privity requirement as it existed at common law. As it developed in England, privity of contract was a relationship or connection between two or
6. See infra notes 13-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of the common law prerequisite of privity of contract to a products liability suit.
7. See infra notes 19-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
gradual judicial and statutory erosion of the common law privity requirement.
8. See infra notes 75-118 and accompanying text for an analysis of how the
erosion of the privity requirement has resulted in judicial misconstruction of
Illinois Commercial Code § 2-318, as well as gaps in the law of products liability
as a whole.
9. In Illinois, the language of Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") § 2318's Alternative A is codified at ILL REV. STAT. ch. 26, para. 2-318 (1989). The
UCC's § 2-318 is the sales statute which extends express and implied warranties
to plaintiffs who are not in privity of contract with the original seller of the
goods. U.C.C. § 2-318 (1990). Presently, there are three alternative versions of
UCC § 2-318 which adopting states may choose from. Id. Each version embodies a different view of the relationship between sales and tort law and attempts
to define the scope of the privity requirement in actions based on breach of
express and implied warranties. See infra notes 50, 67 and 68 for the text of
each UCC § 2-318 alternative and a listing of the states which have adopted each

section.
10. See infra notes 42-74 and accompanying text for an explanation of the
nature and functioning of the three alternative forms of UCC § 2-318.
11. The statutory authority which creates express and implied warranties
in the law of sales are UCC §§ 2-313, 2-314, and 2-315. U.C.C. §§ 2-313, 2-314, 2315 (1990).
12. See infra note 37-38 and accompanying text for an explanation of the
term "economic damages."
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more contracting parties.' 3 At common law, the courts required a
product's buyer to establish that he was in privity with the person
whose product caused his injury. 14 The apparent justification for
the privity requirement was that it limited tort liability to only
those who had a social or contractual duty to conform their behavior to a known standard of care.1 5 Dean Prosser suggests another
reason for the common law privity limitation was that courts were
trying to protect and foster the developing English Industrial
16
Revolution.
Thus, at common law, privity of contract was an irrefutable
prerequisite to the establishment of legal responsibility for an injury caused by sellers' products. 17 Absent privity, a court would dismiss a buyer's suit for his injuries. When the United States adopted
the English common law, it also adopted the English privity
8
requirement.'

J1.

EROSION OF THE

P iv= REQUIREMENT

To soften the harshness of the general requirement of privity
of contract in products liability law, both the courts and the state
legislatures have eroded the privity requirement.' 9 This part of the
13. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1079 (5th ed. 1979).
14. An often cited illustration of the common law prerequisite of privity of
contract in a products liability suit is found in Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng.
Rep. 402 (1842). In Winterbottom, the court dismissed the plaintiff's suit because he did not prove he was in privity with the person who had contracted to
maintain a coach in which plaintiff was riding when a defect in the coach injured the plaintiff. Id. at 402-04.
15. The Winterbottom Court's reasoning for the privity requirement was
that unlimited causes of actions would arise if the court permitted a plaintiff to
maintain his suit, absent privity of contract. Id. at 404-05.
16. Dean Prosser argues that "courts sought, perhaps more or less unconsciously, to limit the responsibilities of growing industry within some reasonable bounds." W. PAGE KEETON Err AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 53, at 357 (5th ed. 1984).
17. § 96, at 681-83.
18. Id.
19. The widespread rejection of the common law privity requirement stems
in large part from the change from agrarian and pre-industrial societies of the
17 00 's and 1800's to contemporary free market societies. Morrow v. New Moon
Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279, 289 (Alaska 1976). An important consequence of this
change is that today a product's producer no longer deals directly with his ultimate consumer, because increasingly complex modern systems of product distribution require multiple layers of product transfers before the product
actually reaches the consumer. Id. Thus, the incidence of a contractual relationship between manufacturer and consumer is now a rare occurrence. Id.
However, the need to keep sellers responsible to their ultimate users has remained the same or has increased. Id.
In sum, in our modem society, it is necessary to remove the shield of privity
to ensure that manufacturers remain responsible to their products' users for the
safety of the products which they send into the stream of commerce. Id. See
also Kassab v. Central Soya, 246 A.2d 848, 852-54 (Pa. 1968) (noting the modern
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comment first addresses the courts' erosion of the privity requirement. This part then examines UCC § 2-318, the primary legislative
attack on the common law privity requirement.
A.

JudicialErosion of Privity

The courts were the first to attack the privity requirement by
creating several limited exceptions to the requirement. The courts
first carved out an exception by barring manufacturers of "inherently dangerous products" from asserting lack of privity as a defense against buyers in the distributive chain2 ° Shortly thereafter,
the courts recognized a similar exception for products which were
dangerous to human life.21 These exceptions to the privity requirement were, however, quite limited since they only applied when the
product's defective condition seriously threatened human life.
Another special, but frequently used, exception to the privity
requirement involved the situation where a defective or unwholesome condition of food or beverages caused a non-privity plaintiff's
injury 2 2 A primary reason underlying the food exception was the
public policy favoring the wholesomeness of food and drink.23 Traditionally, the food exception protected only buyers' family members,2 although it was occasionally extended to others. 25 The
need to reject the privity requirement and extending warranty liability and protection to all parties in the chain of distribution), overruledon othergrounds by,
AM/PM Franchise Ass'n v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 534 A.2d 915 (Pa. 1990).
20. See, eg., Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 407-11 (1852) (plaintiff allowed to recover for injuries from a drug manufacturer which sold a container
of the poisonous plant belladonna, mislabeled as "dandelion," to a druggist, who
resold it to plaintiff).
21. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050,1053 (N.Y. 1916)
(court expanded "inherently dangerous to human life" exception of Thomas to
include not only products which were inherently dangerous, but also those
which would be dangerous if a manufacturer made them defectively). Illinois
adopted the MacPhersonrule in 1934. Rotche v. Buick Motor Co., 193 N.E. 529,
532 (Ill. 1934).
22. See Prosser, supra note 2, at 1103-10 for an exhaustive analysis of the
courts which have and have not adopted the food exception to the privity requirement under various theories.
23. Blarjeske v. Thompson's Restaurant Co., 59 N.E.2d 320, 322-23 (IlM. App.
Ct. 1959) (social policy required that implied warranty of wholesomeness extend to buyer's friend); Welch v. Schiebelhuth, 169 N.Y.S.2d 309, 310-14 (Sup.
Ct. 1957) (based on social policy, implied warranty of wholesomeness of food
extended to ultimate consumer of food). See Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210
N.E.2d 182, 185-86 (Ill. 1964). The Suvada Court summarized the following
three policies that underlie the food exception: 1) the societal interest in protecting human life and health; 2) the fact that the seller has re 1resented the
unwholesome food as safe; and 3) the policy that one who profits from putting
harmful food into the stream of commerce should be liable for resulting injuries. Id.
24. See, e.g., Haut v. Kleene, 50 N.E.2d 855, 857-58 (Ill. App. Ct. 1943) (extending implied warranty of wholesomeness of rabbit meat to buyer's wife and
children); Welter v. Bowman Dairy Co., 47 N.E.2d 739,745-47 (Ill. App. Ct. 1943)
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Illinois courts have also recognized this additional exception to the
privity requirement.2 6
In the 1960's, Dean Prosser developed a unique way of dealing
with the troublesome privity requirement in products liability law.
Prosser believed that it was necessary to separate the warranty concepts of sales law and the negligence concepts of tort law.2 He
(extending implied warranty that milk was fit for human consumption extended to buyer's child).
25. See, eg., Blarjeske, 59 N.E.2d at 322-23 (extending implied warranty of
wholesomeness to mere friend of original buyer who joined her for lunch at

restaurant).
26. Illinois' food exception began with the courts' creation of an "implied
warranty of fitness and wholesomeness for consumption" in all sales of meat or
domestically used provisions. Wiedeman v. Keller, 49 N.E. 210, 211 (Ill. 1897).
A number of cases further extended Wiedeman to protect members of buyers'
families, notwithstanding the lack of privity, under the warranty theory as applied in food and drink cases. See, eg., Haut,50 N.E.2d at 857-58 (implied war-

ranty extended to buyer's immediate family); Welter, 47 N.E.2d at 745-47

(implied warranty extended to buyer's infant son).
Ultimately, the Illinois Appellate Court went even further when it extended the food exception beyond the buyer's family to protect the unrelated
friend of a buyer. Blaijeske, 59 N.E.2d at 323 (implied warranty extended to
buyer's friend who became ill when she ate a portion of buyer's meal).

27. Dean Prosser vehemently argued in his 1960 article, Assault Upon the
Citadel(StrictLiability to the Consumer)that strict liability, not warranty, was
the proper avenue of recovery in products liability litigation.- Prosser, supra

note 2, at 1124-34. Prosser felt that the sales warranty was a "freak hybrid born

of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract." Id. at 1126.
Prosser gave nine reasons for his preference of tort law over contract law in
products liability. Id. at 1127-34. First, he argued that warranty recovery was a
crutch which hindered recognition of strict products liability because it was historically tied to contract law and to antiquated notions of the requirement of
privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. Id. at 1127-28. Second, Prosser noted that warranty theories prevent the recovery of damages
which the law of contracts does not contemplate (e.g., wrongful death). Id. at
1128.
Next, he stated that consumers commonly forget or ignore the names of
manufacturers which prevents them from identifying the proper defendant. Id.
at 1128. Fourth, Prosser asserted that neither the Uniform Sales Act nor the
UCC allowed for sufficient warranty protection to others beyond the initial

buyer. Id. at 1128-29. Fifth, Prosser contended that implied warranties were so
limited in scope that they failed to adequately protect consumers. Id. at 1129-30.

For example, he stated that only "merchants" could give the implied warranty
of merchantability, and buyers' prior inspection of the products could undermine this warranty. Id. Then, Prosser explained that the sellers' defense of
buyers' failure to notify of the breach within a reasonable time would also be

available to manufacturers against unwary consumers. Id. at 1130-31. Seventh,
he warned that sales law would prevent a buyer from recovering for personal
injuries from a seller if the buyer returned the product and rescinded the sale.

Id. at 1131. Eighth, Prosser protested that sellers could easily disclaim implied

warranties under the law of sales, thus defeating the social policy which created
the implied warranty in the first place. Id. at 1131-33.
Last, he maintained that because warranties ran with the title to a product,
warranty protection would not extend to one who did not acquire title to the
product. Id. at 1133-34. He stated that this would leave buyers' employees and

visiting friends unprotected from dangerous products. Id. Prosser concluded
that public policy should not merely impose a contract warranty term, but that
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claimed that products liability fell within the arena of tort law and
not sales law.28 Additionally, Prosser felt that the privity requirement of the common law no longer served its purpose and should be
discarded. 29 Thus, Prosser characterized products liability as the
social imposition of duties, rather than the imposition of duties
through contractual agreement.30 As the reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Prosser embodied his beliefs in Section
402A of the Restatement. 3 '
Section 402A of the Restatement thus created strict products
liability. It requires a plaintiff to prove that a product's defective
and dangerous condition existed at the time the product left the
defendant's control.3 2 The section also requires that the defendant
be in the business of selling the product and the product's defect
proximately caused the plaintiff's injury to his person or property.3 3 . Section 402A specifically rejects the common law defense of
privity of contract. s 4 Illinois adopted the Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 402A in 1964 in Suvada v. White Motor Company.as
it should impose strict tort liability on the seller to the ultimate consumer of the
goods. Id. at 1134. See also William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel,50 MINN.
L. REV. 791 (1966).
28. Prosser, supra note 2, at 1134.
29. Id. at 1116-18. See supra note 19 for an explanation of the prevailing
reasons why courts began to discard the privity requirement.
30. Prosser viewed the imposition of liability for injury to the person from
defective products as within the law of torts. See Prosser, supra note 2, at 112434. He criticized the use of implied warranties to impose such liability as an
"illusory contract mask" for a remedy which was fundamentally strict products
liability in tort. Id at 1134.
31. Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to reach the user or consumer in the condition in
which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relations with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977).

32. Id.
33. Id.
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A(2)(a), (b) (1977). Section
402A rejects another common law defense; the sellers' use of due care.
35. 210 N.E.2d 182, 187 (lll. 1965). In Suvada, a milk delivery company sued
the manufacturer of a defective air brake for injuries suffered when an air
brake on the plaintiff's truck failed, causing an accident. Id. at 183-84. The
Suvada Court held that the defendant's defense of lack of privity failed because
the air brakes were in a defective and dangerous condition when the product
left the manufacturer's control and caused the plaintiff's injury. Id. at 186-88.
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However, Illinois courts have refused to apply strict products
liability where the plaintiff has suffered only economic damages.3
Economic damages include both direct and consequential economic
losses.3 7 These losses include those due to inadequate value, repair
and replacement costs, lost profits, and diminution in the value of a
product due to its inferior quality.-a The definition of economic
damages specifically excludes claims for personal injury and for
damage to property other than to the seller's product.3 9 The reason
for Illinois courts' exclusion of economic damages in strict products
liability cases is that suits for economic damages are more in the
nature of contract actions. 40 Therefore, the Illinois courts' reason
that the scheme of remedies under the UCC is the most appropriate
&4
form of relief for a plaintiff who suffers only economic damages.
B.

Legislative Erosion of Privity

In response to judicial erosion of the privity requirement, the
drafters of the UCC42 codified the courts' prevailing notions of the
The court noted that its holding "coincide[d] with the position taken in section
402A." Id. at 187.

36. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 447-50 (11.
1982).
37. Id. at 449 (citing Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLuM. L. REv. 917, 918 (1966), and Comment, supra note 2, at 541).

See JAMES WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 11-2,
at 457-58 (3d ed. 1988) (explaining the modern economic loss doctrine in prod-

ucts liability law). See also KEETON, supranote 16, § 95, at 678. Prosser's definition of economic damages includes "direct economic loss resulting from the
purchase of an inferior product, and indirect loss, such as loss of profits, resulting from the unfitness of the product adequately to serve the purchaser's purposes." Id.
38. I&

39. Moorman, 435 N.E.2d at 449 (citing Note, supra note 37, at 918). Cf.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1977).

40. Id,
41. Moorman, 435 N.E.2d at 448. Accord KEsrON, supra note 16, § 95A, at
680. Prosser contended that the UCC "is generally regarded as the exclusive
source for ascertaining when a seller is subject to liability for damages if the
claim is based on intangible economic loss not attributable to physical injury to
person or harm to a tangible thing other than the defective product itself." Id.
(emphasis in original).
42. The UCC was, and continues to be, a joint drafting venture of the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws. See AMERICAN LAW INST. & NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: 1962 OFFCIAL TEXT vii
- viii (1962) (from "Report #1 of the Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform
Commercial Code"). These bodies have appointed an eleven-member Permanent Editorial Board ("PEB") to continually research problems concerning the
UCC. Five of the PEB members are appointees from the American Law Institute and five are appointees from the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. Id. at xi. The eleventh member is the Director of the
American Law Institute and is also the Chairman of the PEB. Id. In addition to
its research function, the PEB must report at least every five years on the UCC,
and is responsible for proposing revisions to the various articles of the UCC. Id.
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concept of privity in UCC § 2-318.4 3 The UCC drafters' conceptualization of products liability law substantially differed from that of
Prosser.44 They viewed products liability as arising out of the law
of sales through a set of implied and express promises, called warranties. 45 The drafters of the UCC integrated their beliefs regard4
ing the role of privity in products liability law in UCC § 2-318. 6
The thrust of UCC § 2-318, in its original form, was to embody
the "food exception '4 7 and extend it against sellers of all "goods"
at xi - xv. The PEB is also charged with the duty to propose revisions to the
UCC when "court decisions have rendered the correct interpretation of a provision of the Code in doubt." Id. at xiv.
43. Id. at xxvii.
44. See supra notes 27-30 for an explanation of Prosser's view of products
liability law as part of the law of torts, rather than the law of sales.
45. One commentator has noted that warranty actions are distinguishable
from strict product liability actions based on the nature of the defective product.
AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCT LIABmrTY, supra note 4, § 18:32, at 37. He states
that a strict products liability action is based upon the "defective" and "unreasonably dangerous" status of the product, while a warranty action is based upon

the diminished "utility" of the product. Id.
Other commentators have distinguished strict products liability and war-

ranty actions on several additional grounds. For example, some writers have
noted that, unlike warranty actions, strict products liability actions do not require plaintiffs to give notice of a breach. AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCT LIABILnTY, supra note 4, § 18:33, at 38 (noting that the UCC requires timely notice of
breach of warranty); Morris G. Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial Code: A Commentary on Jurisprudential
Eclipses, Pigeonholesand CommunicationBarriers,17 CASE W. L. REV. 5,27-29
(1965) (noting that, unlike warranty actions, strict products liability does not
require a plaintiff to give notice of defects to seller). See U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a)
(1990).

Additionally, other writers note that a seller cannot disclaim his liability or
limit his buyer's remedies under strict products liability, while he may do so, to
a limited extent, under warranty law. AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCT LIABIITY,
supra note 4, § 18:33, at 38-39 (seller may disclaim warranties and limit remedies under UCC); Rapson, supra note 2, at 709-11 (UCC warranties may be dis.
claimed while strict tort liability cannot). See U.C.C. §§ 2-316(2)-(3), 2-719
(1990). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. m (1977) (discussing the relationship between strict products actions and warranty actions).
Commentators have also noted the differing statute of limitations for warranty actions and strict products liability actions. AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCT
LIABILITY, supra note 4, § 18:33, at 38-39. The statute of limitations for warranty actions is four years, while strict products liability actions tend to have a
shorter statute of limitations (often two years). See U.C.C. § 2-725(1)-(3) (1990).
See also Comment, supra note 2, at 547-48. Additionally, the statute of limitations for warranty actions begins to run at the time of sale, while the statute of
limitations for strict products actions ordinarily begins to run at the time of
injury. See, e.g., Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 309 N.E.2d 550, 552-56 (Ill. 1974).
See also U.C.C. § 2-725(1)-(3) (1990).
46. U.C.C. § 2-318 (1990). The original version of UCC § 2-318 now appears
as "Alternative A." For the text of UCC § 2-318, Alternative 4, see infra note
50.
47. The 1961 commentary to Illinois Commercial Cede § 2-318 stated that
the section "codifies prior Illinois decisions." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, para. 2-318
(Smith-Hurd 1961). The commentary then cites several Illinois cases which rec-
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rather than just sellers of food.4 Therefore, the section extended
both express and implied warranties to a natural person who was
injured and a member of the buyer's family or household or guest
in the buyer's home.49 Thus, the drafters went far beyond the common law exceptions and further eroded the privity requirement.
Twenty nine states continue to adhere to the original form of
UCC § 2-318, which is presently known as Alternative A. 5 0 The
drafters of that section originally intended the section to remain
open to developing case law so that it could reflect the courts' rapidly changing conceptions of the privity requirement. 5 1
The courts and legal commentators have identified two types of
privity in discussing the parameters of UCC § 2-318: "vertical" and
"horizontal" privity. Vertical privity refers to the existence of a relationship between or among all buyers and sellers in a distributive
ognized a "food exception" to the privity requirement in warranty actions
where a buyer's family member suffered an injury. Id.
48. "Goods," as defined in the UCC, are "all things... which are moveable
at the time of identification to the contract for sale." U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (1990).
That definition is quite broad and even includes such diverse items as "the un-

born young of animals" and "growing crops." Id.

49. See U.C.C. § 2-318, Alternative A (1990).
50. Alternative A to UCC § 2-318 provides:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his
home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be
affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
U.C.C. § 2-318, Alternative A (1990).
Twenty-nine states have adopted UCC § 2-318 Alternative A. See ALASKA
STAT. § 45.02.318 (1956); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-2318 (1962); AR. CODE
ANN. § 4-2-318 (Michie 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42a-2-318 (1958); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 28-2-318 (1981); FLA. STAT. ch. 672.318 (1941 & Supp. 1990); GA. CODE
ANN. § 11-2-318 (Michie 1981); IDAHO CODE § 28-2-318 (1947 & Supp. 1990); ILL.
REV. STAT. cl. 26, para. 2-318 (1961); IND. CODE § 26-1-2-318 (1971); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 355.2-318 (Michie/Bobbs-Merill 1970); MD.COMmERCIAL CODE
ANN. § 2-318 (1975); MIcH. Comp. LAws § 440.2318 (1967); MIss. CODE ANN.
§ 75.2-318 (1981); Mo. REV. STAT. § 400.2-318 (1965); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2318 (1989); NEB. REv. STAT. § 2-318 (1943 & Supp. 1990); NEV. REv. STAT.
§ 104.2318 (1986); N.J. REV. STAT. § 12A:2-318 (1962); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50A-2318 (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-318 (1990); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1302.31 (Andersen 1990); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-318 (1963 & Supp. 1990);
OR.REv. STAT. § 72.3180 (1988); 13 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2318 (1984); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 47-2-318 (1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.2-318 (1966); W. VA. CODE
§ 46-2.318 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 402.318 (1964).
When the Illinois legislature adopted the UCC in 1961, UCC § 2-318, Alternative A was the only option available with respect to the reach of UCC warranties to persons other than the original buyer. See AMERICAN LAW INSTIT. &
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: 1962 OFFICIAL TExT 100-01 (1962). Since 1961, Illinois has re-

tained that formulation without variation. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, para. 2318 (1989).
51. See infra note 56 for an analysis of the drafters' intent of UCC § 2-318.
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chain.5 2 Thus, the central issue in analyzing vertical privity is determining whether an ultimate buyer may maintain a suit against a
party in the distributive chain who is not his immediate seller.53
The second type of privity is horizontal privity. Horizontal
privity focuses on the relationship between a defendant and a consumer, user, donee, employee, bailee, bystander, lessee or one
whom the product otherwise affects, but who did not obtain the
product through the distributive chain.5 Thus, the central issue
with respect to horizontal privity is determining whether one, other
than the first consumer buyer, may maintain a suit against a seller
in the distribution chain.1 Accordingly, UCC § 2-318 was intended
to remain subject to judicial development with respect to vertical
privity, but not horizontal privity.5
52. See Knox v. North Am. Car Corp., 399 N.E.2d 1355, 1359 (Ill. App. Ct.
1980), overruled in parton othergrounds by Whitaker v. Lian Feng Mach. Co.,
509 N.E.2d 591, 594 (IlM. App. Ct. 1987). The Knox court stated that "[v]ertical
privity includes all parties up the distributive chain from the immediate seller."
Id. See also WILuAm D. HAwKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2318:01, at 421 (1990) (vertical privity is the relationship among all the buyers
and sellers within a marketing chain). Note that the terms of section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts removes any remnant of the requirement of
privity within the distributive chain in strict products actions. See RESTATE.
MNT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A (1977). For the text of this section, see supra
note 31.
53. AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCT LIABILITY, supra note 4, § 21:3, at 13.
54. Id. See also PAUL SHERMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY FOR THE GENERAL.
PRACTITIONER § 9.22, at 280-81 (1981) (concept of horizontal privity is the relationship between the plaintiff and the initial consumer buyer of goods). Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts removed the requirement of privity
between users and consumers not in the chain of distribution and sellers in the
chain of distribution, but left open the question of whether bystanders must be
in privity. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. o (1977).
55. AMERICAN LAw OF PRODUCT LABIITY, supra note 4, § 21:3, at 13.
Thus, "[h]orizontal privity is not, in reality, a state of privity, but rather one of
non-privity. The term "horizontal privity" refers to those who are not in the
distributive chain of a product but who, nonetheless, use the product and retain
a relationship with the purchaser." Szajna v. General Motors Corp., 503 N.E.2d
760, 765 (Ill.
1986). See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 37, § 11-2, at 456-57 (both
vertical and horizontal privity are really states of non.privity under which the
law has recognized the non-privity plaintiff's cause of action against a defendant).
Some commentators have noted a third type of privity relationship, which
they call "diagonal privity." See, e.g., HAwKLAND, supra note 52, § 2-318:01, at
421; Harry G. Prince, Overprotecting the Consumer? 2-607(3)(a) Notice of
Breach in Non-privity Contexts, 66 N.C. L. REV. 107, 110 n.12 (1987). Diagonal
privity focuses on the nature of the relationship between a party in the distributive chain and any ultimate user or person whom the product affects, regardless
of whether he was the buyer from a party in the chain of distribution. HAwKLAND, supra note 52, § 2-318:01, at 421. Thus, diagonal privity seeks to combine
the components of both horizontal and vertical privity. Id. (" 'Diagonal privity'
involves a combination of horizontal and vertical privity.").
56. Alternative A to UCC § 2-318 deals only with horizontal privity and not
vertical privity. The drafters of the UCC wanted only vertical privity to be subject to developing case law on products liability. Thus, the third comment to
UCC § 2-318 provides:
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In 1974, the Illinois Supreme Court took advantage of this intended flexibility. The court determined that absence of privity between the consumer buyer and the manufacturer (vertical privity)
does not, in light of UCC § 2-318, preclude a plaintiff from recoverring for personal injuries under the theory of breach of implied
warranty. 57 This move represented a major step away from the
common law privity requirement. However, the Illinois courts have
refused such suits where the plaintiff alleged only economic damages.5s Furthermore, the law in Illinois as to horizontal privity has
The first alternative expressly includes as beneficiaries within its provisions the family, household and guests of the purchaser. Beyond this, the
section in this form is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the
developing case law on whether the seller's warranties,given to his buyer
who resells, extend to other persons in the distributivechain.

U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt. 3 (1990) (emphasis added).

The Morrow Court observed

that UCC § 2-318 specifically addresses horizontal privity, but is "totally silent"
as to vertical privity. Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279, 287
(Alaska 1976). See also AImucAN LAw OF PRODUCr LIABILrnT, supra note 4,
§ 21:1, at 11 (UCC § 2-318 addresses only horizontal privity). But see LEN
YOUNG SMITH Er Ai., BusnEsS LAw AND THE REGULATION OF BusINESS 335
(1984) ("[The Code ... sets a minimum beyond which the states may expand
through case law. Most states have judicially accepted the Code's invitation to
relax the requirements of horizontal privity."); Walter K. Swartzkoph, Note,
Products Liability: Employees and the Uniform Commercial Code, Section 2318, 68 DIcK. L. REv. 444, 451-53 (1963) (arguing that UCC § 2-318 comment 3
provides an avenue for broadening the classes of third party beneficiaries stated
in UCC § 2-318, Alternative A).
Several Illinois courts have interpreted comment three as a license to further "develop" the case law with respect to horizontal privity. See Wheeler v.
Sunbelt Tool Co., 537 N.E.2d 1332, 1340 (Ill. App. Ct) (court may add "employees" to UCC § 2-318, Alternative A classes), appeal denied, 545 N.E.2d 134 (M1.
1989); Whitaker v. Lian Feng Mach. Co., 509 N.E2d 591, 595 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)
(extending UCC § 2-318, Alternative A protection to include employee of buyer
of defective band saw); Boddie v. Litton Unit Handling Sys. 455 N.E.2d 142,151
(111. App. CL 1983) (in dictum, the court stated that UCC § 2-318, Alternative A
can and should include buyers' employees); Knox, 399 N.E.2d at 1360 (in dictum,
the court noted that buyers' employees may be included under UCC § 2-318,
Alternative A).
In addition, other Illinois cases have stretched contract theories to expand
warranty protection to plaintiffs who do not neatly fall within the UCC § 2-318
classes of third party beneficiaries. See, eg., Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. Continental Can Co., 219 N.E.2d 726, 732 (III. App Ct. 1966) (Under the UCC, court extended implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose to common law
third party beneficiary who was not in horizontal privity with defendant manufacturer); Collins Co. v. Carboline Co., 532 N.E.2d 834, 843 (Ill. 1988) (extending
UCC warranty protection to recipient of valid contractual assignment under Illinois Commercial Code § 2-210).
57. Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 309 N.E.2d 550, 555-56 (Ill. 1974). For a similar result, see Kassab v. Central Soya, 246 A.2d 848, 852-56 (Pa. 1968) (extending
UCC warranty liability and protection to all parties in the distributive chain),
overruled on other grounds by, AM/PM Franchise Ass'n v. Atlantic Ritchfield
Co., 584 A.2d 915 (Pa. 1990).
58. Rothe v. Maloney Cadillac Inc., 518 N.E.2d 1028, 1029-30 (IMI. 1988) (lack
of privity of contract was defense in UCC warranty action where consumer
buyer of automobile sued car manufacturer for direct and consequential economic damages); Szajna v. General Motors Corp., 503 N.E.2d 760, 767 (Ill. 1986)
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been turbulent and inconsistent.5 9
In 1966, amidst growing hostility toward the requirement of
privity in tort actions,6° the Permanent Editorial Board ("PEB") of
the UCC amended UCC § 2-318. 6 1 The PEB added two even
broader alternatives to the original section.6 2 The first of these,
UCC § 2-318, Alternative B, extends both express and implied warranties to natural persons whom the seller could reasonably foresee
that a personal injury would result from the breach of the warrantyPca This alternative differs from Alternative A in that it does
not specifically identify which groups are protected by warranties.
The second new alternative, UCC § 2-318, Alternative C, is the
broadest of the three alternatives. Alternative C extends express
and implied warranties to any person, natural or artificial, whom
the seller could reasonably foresee would suffer any injury as a result of a breach.64
The PEB's essential purpose inadding these alternatives was to
capture recent developments in the case law. These developments
reflected the rapid erosion of the privity requirement in sales law.6
The PEB maintained three separate alternatives because it felt that
states, in addressing the issue, did not have to answer uniformly.
Rather, the PEB wanted each state to have flexibility in tailoring its
(refusing to permit warranty action for economic damages where privity of contract did not exist between manufacturer and car buyer); Tokar v. Crestwood
Importers, Inc., 532 N.E.2d 382, 385 (M. App. Ct. 1988) (where plaintiff alleged
only economic damages, lack of privity between plaintiff and car manufacturer
was a defense to warranty suit); Spiegel v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 466 N.E.2d 1040,
1042-43 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (lack of privity in suit by ultimate consumer of a
copy machine against manufacturer was valid defense to warranty action which
sought only economic damages). For a contrary result under Alaska law, see
Morrow, 548 P.2d at 290-92 (extending implied warranty protection to all parties
in distributive chain notwithstanding fact that plaintiff sought only economic

damages).
59. See infra notes 76-93 and accompanying text for an explanation of the
turbulence in Illinois case law as to UCC § 2-318's horizontal privity
requirement.
60. At the time of the revision of UCC § 2-318 in 1966, Illinois, for example,
was embroiled in a battle against the privity requirement. See, e.g., Suvada v.
White Motors Co., 210 N.E.2d 182, 184-88 (Ill. 1965) (abolishing privity requirement in tort law by adopting strict products liability).
61. An additional reason as to why the PEB decided to amend UCC § 2-318
was that it sought to prevent the states from further creating modified versions
of that section. HAWKLAND, supra note 52, § 2-318:01, at 426. See supra note 42
for an explanation of the structure and function of the PEB.
62. See U.C.C. § 2-318, Alternatives B, C (1990). See infra notes 67 and 68
for the text of UCC § 2-318, Alternatives B and C.
63. U.C.C. § 2-318, Alternative B (1990).
64. U.C.C. § 2-318, Alternative C (1990).
65. HAwKLAND, supra note 52, § 2-318:01, at 426. Also, the PEB wanted to
prevent the states from creating additional versions of UCC § 2-318 so that uniformity would be encouraged to the greatest extent possible, even though each
state had varying products liability policies. Id.
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products liability law to meet its needs.6 Since 1966, nine states
have adopted UCC § 2-318 Alternative B,6 7 and seven states have
adopted UCC § 2-318 Alternative C.r s Illinois, however, has not
adopted either of these alternatives and retains its original codification of UCC § 2-318.69
Consistent with the the UCC's erosion of privity, the PEB is
presently considering a major revision to Article 2 of the UCC, and
UCC § 2-318 is a prime target for change. 70 The PEB, in conjunction with the American Law Institute and the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, appointed a study group
in March, 1988 to determine whether Article 2 of the UCC needed
revision. 71 The study group completed and published its prelimi66. See AMERICAN LAw INsT.

& NATIONAL

CONFERENCE OF CoMM'Rs ON

UNIFORM STATE LAws, UNIFORM COMMERCIL CODE: 1972 OFFICIAL TEXT xxviii

(1972) ('"The [Permanent Editorial] Board... felt that Section 2-318.. . is not a
section requiring uniformity throughout all American jurisdictions" so it proposed two additional sections to preserve uniformity at a basic level).
67. Alternative B to UCC § 2-318 provides:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the
goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may
not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
U.C.C. § 2-318, Alternative B (1990). Nine states have adopted UCC § 2-318, Alternative B. See ALA. CODE § 2-318 (1975); COLO. REV. STAT. § 4-2-318 (1973);
DEL.CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2-318 (1961); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-2-318 (1964); N.Y.
UCC LAW § 2-318 (Consol. 1971); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-318 (Law. Co-op. 1987);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 2-318 (1966); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 11A § 2-318 (1990);
Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-235 (1990).

68. Alternative C to UCC § 2-318 presently provides:

A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any person who
may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods
and who is injured by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or

limit the operation of this section with respect to injury to the person of an
individual to whom the warranty extends.
U.C.C. § 2-318, Alternative C (1990). Seven states have adopted UCC § 2-318,
Alternative C. See HAw. REV. STAT. § 490-2-318 (1985); IowA CODE ANN.
§ 554.2318 (1967 & Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.2-318 (1966); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 41-02-35 (1983); RI. GEN. LAWS § 6A-2-318 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 57A-2-318 (1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-2-318 (1990).
Several state legislatures have completely omitted or rewritten UCC § 2318 to more closely reflect their own state's products liability policies. See, eg.,
California: omitted; Maine: MAINE REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-318 (1964 &
Supp. 1990) (lack of privity is no defense to a warranty action under the UCC);
Massachucetts: MASS. GEN.L. ANN. ch. 11, § 2-318 (West 1990) (lack of privity is
not a defense to a UCC warranty action); New Hampshire: N.H. REV.STAT.
ANN. § 382A:2-318 (1986) (lack of privity is no defense in warranty action); Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (1950 & Supp. 1990) (lack of privity is not a defense to a UCC warranty action). See infra note 142 for the text of the
Massachucetts version of UCC § 2-318.
69. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 26, para. 2-318 (1989).
70. See RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE ARTICLE 2

STUDY GRouP pt. 3, at 31-32 (1990).
71. Id. pt. 1, at 1.
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nary report in March, 1990.72
In its report, the study group closely scrutinized the reach of
express and implied warranties to third party beneficiaries under
UCC § 2-318.73 The study group cited numerous problems with
UCC § 2-318 in its present form.74 The study group concluded that
UCC § 2-318 was "an anachronism" and determined that "a major
revision of § 2-318 was required." 75 Thus, the process of statutory
erosion of privity in the law of sales is far from complete. However,
it appears that the PEB is contemplating another step towards the
complete elimination of the privity requirement in sales law in the
near future.
III.

ILLiNOis LAW: JUDICIAL MISCONSTRUCTION OF UCC

§ 2-318

AND GAPS IN THE LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILY
The erosion of the privity requirement in tort and sales law has
led to judicial misconstruction of UCC § 2-318 and gaps in the law of
products liability as a whole. This section examines Illinois courts'
misconstruction of Illinois Commercial Code § 2-318. This section
then analyzes some of the gaps which Illinois must fill in order to
have an integrated body of products liability law. This section concludes that a revision to UCC § 2-318 is necessary to remedy these
misconstructions and gaps.
A. JudicialMisconstruction of UCC § 2-318
In an attempt to provide plaintiffs with a remedy where one is
needed, the Illinois courts have gone beyond the intended scope of
UCC § 2-318, Alternative A. In other words, Illinois courts are extending warranty protection to a broader sphere of horizontal privity plaintiffs than the Illinois legislature intended at the time it
adopted UCC § 2-318.
72. Id.
73. Id. pt. 3, at 31-36.

74. The study group members agreed that a remote seller's express warranties, which "become part of the basis of the [new] buyer's bargain with its
seller" should carry over to the new buyer. SPEIDEL, supra note 70, pt. 3, at 32.
They further agreed that an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
would not extend to a remote buyer where the remote seller and remote buyer
have not directly bargained. Id. pt. 3, at 33. However, the study group split on
the issue of whether implied warranties of merchantability may run to third
party beneficiaries. Id. pt. 3, at 33-35. Some members felt that privity was essential to UCC warranty actions except where the original buyer assigned his
rights to a new buyer or where the original seller's express warranty was "part
of the basis of the bargain" in the sale to the new buyer. Id. pt. 3, at 33-34.
Other members posited that privity requirements should be entirely eliminated
from UCC § 2-318 because the requirements place unfair and unrealistic obstacles to manufacturers' accountability for their products and to buyers' recovery
for economic damages. Id. pt. 3, at 34-35.

75. Id. at 31-32.
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In 1961, Illinois adopted UCC § 2-318, Alternative A, 76 which
was the only option available to the states at that time. 77 At first,
Illinois courts firmly adhered to the language of the relatively narrow section.78 Since that time, a number of Illinois courts have expanded the UCC § 2-318 classes of third party beneficiaries of
warranties to impose liability on manufacturers apparently trying
79
to avoid unjust results.
A recent case which is representative of Illinois' trend is Whitaker v. Lian Feng Mach. Co.80 In Whitaker, an employee of the
purchaser of a band saw was injured while using the saw.81 The
employee sued the manufacturer, the importer and the seller of the
76. The original comment to Illinois Commercial Code § 2-318 states "[t]he
first sentence [of UCC § 2-318] codifies prior Illinois decisions." ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 26, para. 2-318 (Smith-Hurd 1961). See, ag., Welter v. Bowman Dairy, 47
N.E.2d 739, 745-47 (Ill. App. Ct. 1943) (extending implied warranty extended to
child of buyer of defective milk). But see Blarjeske v. Thompson's Restaurant,
59 N.E.2d 320,323 (Ill. App. Ct. 1945) (extending implied warranty of quality of
food to buyer's unrelated friend).
77. One Illinois court mistakenly reported that Illinois' choice of Alternative A was a conscious and voluntary selection among the three alternatives
presently available under UCC § 2-318. Miller v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 500
N.E.2d 557, 558-59 (IM. App. Ct. 1986), overruled by, Whitaker v. Lian Feng
Mach. Co., 509 N.E.2d 591 (111. App. Ct. 1987). The MillerCourt's mistake lies in
the fact that the three alternatives did not exist under the heading of UCC § 2318 until 1966, five years after Illinois adopted UCC § 2-318. See U.C.C. § 2-318
(1990).
78. See, e.g., Hemphill v. Sayers, 552 F. Supp. 685, 693 (S.D. IM. 1982) (college football player's implied warranty suit for personal injury allegedly due to
defective football helmet which school purchased from defendant failed because player was not technically within a UCC § 2-318 class); In re Johns Mansville Asbestosis Cases, 511 F. Supp. 1235, 1239-40 (N.D. M11.1981) (rejecting
plaintiff's argument that he was the functional equivalent of a class stated in
UCC § 2-318); Miller, 500 N.E.2d at 557-59 (customer of transmission shop was
not "functional equivalent" of a "guest," and was not entitled to UCC warranty
protection under § 2-318 because he did not fit any of the UCC § 2-318 classes).
79. Several recent Illinois cases have over-analyzed UCC § 2-318 through
the use of commentary language intended for expansion of vertical privity, not
horizontal privity. See, eg., Wheeler v. Sunbelt Tool Co. Inc., 537 N.E.2d 1332,
1339-41 (Ill. App. Ct.) (expanding Illinois Commercial Code § 2-318 to include
employees as third party beneficiaries of UCC warranties), appeal denied, 545
N.E.2d 134 (1989); Whitaker, 509 N.E.2d at 594-95 (holding that Illinois Commercial Code § 2-318 comment 3 authorizes the judiciary to read into that section an extension of implied warranty of merchantability to buyers' employees);
Boddie v. Linton, 455 N.E.2d 142,151 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (third party beneficiary
status includes employees of purchasers under Illinois Commercial Code § 2318); Knox v. North Am. Car Co., 399 N.E.2d 1355, 1359-60 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980),
(in dicta, court found buyer's employee within scope of Illinois Commercial
Code § 2-318 since he was the "functional equivalent" of guest or family member) overruled in part by, Whitaker v. Ilan Feng Mach. Co., 509 N.E.2d at 594
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987). Cf. R. HENSON, THE LAW OF SALES § 6.10, at 250 (1985)
(noting the potential for judicial expansion of UCC § 2-318 classes of third party
beneficiaries).
80. 509 N.E.2d 591 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
81. Whitaker, 509 N.E.2d at 592.
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saw, under various theories of liability.8 2 The trial court dismissed
the employee's warranty counts for lack of privity, and the em83
ployee subsequently appealed.
On appeal, the Whitaker Court overruled several prior Illinois
cases8 4 and held that UCC warranties extend to a buyer's employees under certain circumstances. Specifically, the Whitaker Court
held that the warranty would extend to the injured employee if the
employee's safety and use of the product were part of the basis of
85
the bargain when the employer purchased the saw.
The Whitaker Court based its reasoning entirely on comment 3
to UCC § 2 -3 1 8 s6 and comment 2 to UCC § 2-313.87 The court interpreted those comments as revealing an intent to allow the courts to
add classes of horizontal non-privity plaintiffs to those stated in
UCC § 2-318, Alternative A.8 8
82. Id. The plaintiff in Whitaker, asserted several other theories of liability
at trial. Id. However, these other theories were not material to the Whitaker
case, since the only issue on appeal was whether an employee of a purchaser
had standing to sue the seller on a breach of warranty theory under UCC § 2318. Id.
83. Id.

84. The Whitaker Court specifically overruled the Knox and Miller Court's
decisions. Whitaker, 509 N.E.2d at 594. See Knox v. North Am. Car Corp., 399
N.E.2d 1355 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980), overruled in part by Whitaker v. Lian Feng
Machine Co., 509 N.E.2d 591 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); Miller v. Sears, Roebuck and
Co., 500 N.E.2d 557 (Il. App. Ct. 1986), overruled in part by Whitaker v. Lian

Feng Machine Co., 509 N.E.2d 591 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).

85. Whitaker, 509 N.E.2d at 595. Illinois courts have upheld the Whitaker
Court's reasoning and holding as recently as 1989. See Wheeler v. Sunbelt Tool
Co., Inc., 537 N.E.2d 1332, 1340 (Ill. App. Ct.) (upholding Whitaker's reasoning
and applying it to extend UCC warranty to employee of buyer), appealdenied,
545 N.E.2d 134 (Ill. 1989).
86. See supranote 56 for the text of UCC § 2-318 comment 3 and a discussion of other courts' and commentators' construction of that comment. The
Whitakcer Court even went so far as to state that "it is apparent that where the
comment speaks of 'developing case law' it includes developing case law regarding persons in horizontal privity with sellers." Whitaer, 509 N.E.2d at 594.
87. Comment 2 to UCC § 2-313 states in pertinent part that the "warranty
sections ... are not designed ... to disturb those lines of case growth which have

recognized that warranties need not be confined... to the direct parties to... a
contract....

Section 2-318 expressly recognize[s] ...

case law development

within one particular area. Beyond that the matter is left to the case law..
U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 2 (1990).
88. In Whitaker, the court added "employees" of a buyer of goods as a class
of non-privity plaintiffs to those stated in UCC § 2-318, Alternative A. Whitaker, 509 N.E.2d at 594-95. Accord R. HENSON, supra note 79, § 6.10, at 250 (claiming potential for judicial expansion of third party beneficiaries who may receive
UCC warranties); 1 THoMAS M. QUINN, QUINN'S UCC FORMS AND PRACTICE
2-318, at 2-256 to 2-257 (1987) (warning that UCC § 2-318 should not be taken too
literally because courts sometimes construe that section quite liberally);
Swartzkoph, supra note 56, at 447-53 (arguing that UCC § 2-318 comment 3 can
be read to permit courts to extend that section's classes of third party beneficiaries to include buyers' employees). The Whitaker Court's reasoning, however, leaves the door open to other broader interpretations of Illinois
Commercial Code § 2-318.
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However, the Whitaker Court's interpretation of the comments is inconsistent with the real intent of UCC § 2-318. The primary goal of UCC § 2-318 is to expressly identify the precise scope
of the state's horizontal privity requirement in products liability
suits based on UCC warranties.8 9 The commentary to that section
was intended to permit state courts control of only vertical
privity. °
Thus, the Whitaker Court deviates from the language and true
intent of Illinois Commercial Code § 2-318. The cumulative effect
of the Whitaker approach is that Illinois courts have adopted UCC
§ 2-318, Alternative B through judicial fiat.9 1 Even though the
Whitaker Court misinterpreted UCC § 2-318, it does not necessarily
follow that the court's goal of providing a needed remedy was an
unworthy one.92 However, the Illinois legislature is far better
89. See supra note 56 and accompanying text for an explanation of the

drafter's intent of UCC § 2-318 comment 3.
90. Contrary to the Whitaker Court's interpretation, UCC § 2-318 comment
3 merely identifies the fact that the section contemplates no infringement on
developing state law regarding the vertical privity requirement, or more precisely, the reduction thereof. Szajna v. General Motors Corp., 503 N.E2d 760,
765-66 (I. 1986). Comment 3 of UCC § 2-318 thus identifies the drafters' intent
to clearly identify the scope of the state's horizontal privity requirement, and
does not provide an avenue for judicial reduction of the horizontal privity requirement of that section.
This point receives additional support from the fact that comment 3 and
UCC § 2-318's Alternatives B and C were written in the mid-1960's at a time
when state tort law regarding vertical privity was in a state of rapid change.
Se e.g., Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182 (M. 1964). Thus, UCC
§ 2-318 identifies and limits the permissible relaxation of the horizontal privity
requirement while expressly recognizing judicial flux in the requirement of
vertical privity.
91. The Whitaker decision leaves open the question whether the courts
may add classes, other than employees, to the terms of UCC § 2-318 through
judicial action. However, other courts may easily apply the reasoning of Whitaker if they wish to remove the privity barrier beyond that which the Illinois
Legislature has authorized through its adoption of UCC § 2-318, Alternative A.
It is interesting to note that only one year prior to Whitaker, the same
court that handed down the Whitaker decision specifically addressed the exact
same issue of extending the UCC § 2-318 classes and proclaimed that "[a] court's
function is to declare and enforce the law as enacted by the legislature and interpret the language when necessary but not enact new provisions or substitute
different ones." Miller v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 500 N.E.2d 557, 559 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1986), overruled in part by, Whitaker v. Lian Feng Mach. Co., 509 N.E.2d
591, 594 (IMI. App. Ct. 1987).
92. In fact, like the Whitaker Court, a number of other courts have held
that other classes of non-privity plaintiffs may be added to those expressly
stated in UCC § 2-318, Alternative A. See, e.g., Speed Fasteners, Inc. v. Newsom, 382 F.2d 395, 398 n.5 (10th Cir. 1967) (using UCC § 2-318 comment 3 to add
classes of third party beneficiaries to that section); Green v. A.B. Hagglund and
Soner, 634 F. Supp. 790, 794-95 (D. Idaho 1986) (stretching UCC § 2-318 to include corporate buyers' employees); Hoffman v. A.B. Chance Co., 346 F. Supp.
991, 993 (M.D. Pa. 1972) (relying on comment 3 to UCC § 2-318 to reduce the
horizontal privity barrier); Delta Oxygen Co. v. Scott, 383 S.W.2d 885, 892-93
(Ark. 1964) (including employees under UCC § 2-318, Alternative A); Barfield
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equipped to pursue the goal of providing remedies for breach of
warranties, through its ability to amend Illinois Commercial Code
93
§ 2-318 or adopt other UCC § 2-318 alternatives.
v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 197 So. 2d 545, 546-47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 1967) (no
longer requiring privity of contract in an implied warranty cause of action,
therefore, employee allowed to sue manufacturer of hose bought by employer);
Wheeler v. Sunbelt Tool Co., 537 N.E.2d 1332, 1340 (Ill. App. Ct.) (applying
Whitaker tc extend warranty protection to buyer's employee under UCC § 2318), appealdenied, 545 N.E.2d 134 (1989); Boddie v. Litton Unit Handling Sys.
455 N.E2d 142, 151 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (in dictum, broadening UCC § 2-318, Alternative A to include employees); Knox v. North Am. Car Co., 399 N.E.2d 1355,
1360 (MI1.App. Ct. 1980) (noting, in dictum, that employees may be included
under UCC § 2-318, Alternative A), overruledin partby, Whitaker v. Lian Feng
Machine Co., 509 N.E.2d 591,594 (Il. App. Ct. 1987); McNally v. Nicholson Mfg.
Co., 313 A.2d 913, 916-23 (Me. 1973) (including employees as donees-beneficiaries within classes of UCC § 2-318 third party beneficiaries); Ciampichini v.
Ring Bros., Inc., 339 N.Y.S.2d 716, 718-20 (App. Div. 1973) (employees included
within UCC § 2-318); Western Seed Prod. Corp. v. Campbell, 442 P.2d 215, 217,
(Or. 1968), cert denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969) (noting that pursuant to Oregon's
Commercial Code, the court has joined in abolishing the privity requirement in
warranty recovery); Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 319 A.2d 903, 904-08
(Pa. 1974) (extending UCC § 2-318 coverage to employees by abolishing horizontal privity requirement); Dippel v. Sciano, 155 N.W.2d 55, 62 (Wis. 1967) (authorizing the addition of third party beneficiary classes to those already stated in
UCC § 2-318, Alternative A). Accord 1 STATE OF NEw YoR LAW REvIsION
COMM'N, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 412-16 (reprint ed. 1990)
(arguing that the UCC was wrong in failing to add "employees" to UCC § 2-

318).
In addition, all drafts of UCC § 2-318 between May, 1949 and September,
1950 would have permitted the buyers' employees recovery for breach of warranty. See AMERICAN LAW INsT. & NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: MAY 1949 DRAFT 104-06
(1949) (text and cmt. 2); AMERICAN LAW INST. & NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: SPRING 1950

PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT 122-24 (text and cmt. ed. 1950). However, the drafters

of the UCC excluded "employees" from § 2-318 in the spring of 1952. Compare
AMERICAN LAw INST. & NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAws, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

SPRING, 1950 PROPOSED FINAL

DRAFT 122-23 (text and cmt. ed. 1950) (comment 3 expressly states that employees fall within § 2-318) with AMERICAN LAW INST. & NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMM'Rs ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: 1952 OrnCIAL DRAFT (1952) (modified § 2-318 through a subtle manipulation of language
resulting in a narrowing of the scope of that section. Additionally, comment 3
states that beyond family, household and guests of the purchaser, § 2-318 is neutral, especially as to employees of a buyer). Thus, it appears that the drafters of
the UCC made a conscious decision to exclude employees from the classes entitled to protection under UCC § 2-318.
93. It is desirable that the arbitrary classes established under UCC § 2-318
be expanded under the proper legislative authority. However, judicial activism
should be neither a substitute nor a replacement for reasoned state legislative
policy determination. See, e.g., Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324, 342 (Ill.
1990) (stating that the legislature's ability to "hold hearings and determine public policy" made it a more appropriate forum for the adoption of expansive tort
theories, such as market share liability).
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B. U.C.C. § 2-318 and Strict ProductsLiability: The Gaps
1.

Purely Economic Damages

A major gap between Illinois strict products liability law and
Illinois Commercial Code § 2-318 is in dire need of filling. In its
most fundamental terms, this gap encompasses persons who are not
in privity with the defendant and who have no remedy for purely
economic losses 94 under either sales or tort law in Illinois.
The Illinois courts have refused to extend strict products liability 95 to provide a remedy for plaintiffs who suffer solely economic
97
losses.96 This rule is in accord with that of many other states.
The reasoning for this rule is that the predominant character of the
injury sounds in contract rather than in tort.98 Furthermore, the

courts argue that since a "comprehensive scheme of remedies" exists under sales law for breach of warranty, a plaintiff should avail
himself of those remedies instead of relying on strict products liability.99 Therefore, the Illinois courts have concluded that recovery
94. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text for a definition of "economic losses."

95. See Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182 (IMI. 1965). In Suvada,

the Illinois Supreme Court quoted section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts in adopting strict products liability. Id. at 187.
96. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 447-50 (IMl.
1982) (denying recovery of purely direct and consequential economic losses due
to defects in a grain storage tank on a strict products liability theory).
Illinois has created an exception to the rule that one suffering only economic loss may not recover under strict products liability in tort. Vaughn v.
General Motors Corp., 466 N.E.2d 195, 196-98 (M. 1984). This exception is quite
narrow, however, and requires that the economic loss occurr in a "sudden and
calamitous" manner. Id. at 196-98. The Vaughn Court held that where defective brakes caused the plaintiff's truck to crash, the plaintiff could recover
purely economic damages (loss of the vehicle) under a theory of strict products
liability although plaintiff alleged no other type of damages. Id. at 197.
97. See, e.g., Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279,283-86 (Alaska
1976) (strict products liability count properly dismissed where plaintiff sought
only economic damages); Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 148-51 (Cal.
1965) (stating, in dictum, that strict products liability is applicable only where
there has been physical injury to person or property); Spring Motors Distrib. v.
Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 665-72 (N.J. 1985) (purely economic damages not
recoverable under theory of strict products liability). See also Timothy L. Bertschy, The Economic Loss Doctrinein Illinois after Moorman, 71 ILL. B.J. 346,
354-55 (1983) (criticizing Moorman's bar on non-privity plaintiffs' recovery of
economic damages); Bruce W. McGee, Comment, Implied Warrantiesand 'Economic Loss', 24 BAYLOR L. REv. (1972) (noting that plaintiffs may not recover
economic damages under strict products liability as general rule). But see
Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305, 312-13 (N.J. 1965) (permitting recovery for economic damages under strict products theory).
98. See, e.g., Moorman, 435 N.E.2d at 450 ('The remedy for economic loss ...
lies in contract.").
99. Kishwaukee Community Health Serv. Ctr. v. Hospital Bldg. and Equip
Co., 638 F. Supp. 1492, 1502 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (agreeing with Moorman that UCC
should be the source of remedy in economic loss cases as a general rule); Moorman, 435 N.E.2d at 448 (noting that the remedies under the UCC should apply
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for these plaintiffs should be under sales law, rather than tort
law.1 0o
Similarly, Illinois sales law bars many would-be plaintiffs from
recovering economic damages. Illinois' Commercial Code § 2-318
extends warranty protection to anyone within the product's distributive chain, and also to a buyers' employees, family, household and
guests in his household.1 0 ' However, none of these groups may sue
for purely economic losses unless they are in privity of contract
with the defendant. This effect results from the operation of Illinois Commercial Code § 2-318 which permits these groups to recover only for personal injuries. 10 2 Also, section 2-318 only extends
warranties to "natural persons" who fall within its terms.10 3 Thus,
the section's negative implication similarly excludes all "artificial
persons" from recovering for purely economic losses unless they
to economic loss cases). See Terrance A. Turner, Comment, The Vexing Problem of the Purely Economic Loss in ProductsLiability: An Injury in Search of
a Remedy, 4 SETON HALL L. REv. 145, 174-76 (1972) (acknowledging the general

rule that the law of sales governs actions for economic loss).
100. Moorman, 435 N.E.2d at 448. But cf. Morrow v. New Moon Homes, 548
P.2d 279, 290-92 (Alaska 1976) (barring recovery of economic loss under strict
products liability, but permitting non-privity plaintiff's recovery under implied
warranty theory); Moorman, 435 N.E.2d at 455-57 (Simon, J., specially concurring) (law of contracts should develop a system of sales remedies for non-privity
plaintiffs who allege only economic loss).
101. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, para. 2-318 (1989). Note that Whitaker,and not
Illinois UCC § 2-318, is the reason why UCC warranty protection is extended to
employees under that section. Whitaker, 509 N.E.2d 591, 594-95 (Ill. App. Ct.
1987).
102. Rothe v. Maloney Cadillac, Inc., 518 N.E.2d 1028, 1029-30 (IlM. 1988)
(non-privity consumer could not maintain a breach of implied warranty action
against car manufacturer where he alleged solely economic damages); Szajna v.
General Motors Corp., 503 N.E.2d 760, 762-767 (Ill. 1986) (lack of privity of contract between consumer purchaser and car manufacturer barred plaintiff's implied warranty count which sought only economic damages); Spiegel v. Sharp
Elecs. Corp., 466 N.E.2d 1040, 1042-45 (IMl. App. Ct. 1984) (lack of privity between purchaser of copier and manufacturer was bar to recovery for economic
damages on an implied warranty theory).
Prosser supports this proposition. He states in his treatise on the law of
torts that privity should still be a defense to a warranty action where the alleged damages are economic. KEETON, supra note 16, § 95A, at 681. He supports
this contention "on the theory that the parties should be permitted by contract
to allocate the risk of losses as they choose." Id.
Alaska has held to the contrary. In Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., the
court noted other courts' apparent fear that acknowledging suits for economic
loss under warranty theory, absent privity, would make forecasting losses speculative, and make it impossible for manufacturers to insure against risk of
losses. Morrow, 548 P.2d 279, 290-92 (Alaska 1976). However, the Morrow
Court stated that such reasoning improperly diverted courts' attention away
from the real reason that implied warranties exist in the first place, i.e., to provide protection for the consumer. Id. at 291. The court concluded that lack of
privity was not a defense to a consumer's implied warranty action for direct
economic losses against the manufacturer. Id. at 291-92.
103. See ILL REV. STAT. ch. 26, para- 2-318 (1989).
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have contracted with the defendant. 104
The Illinois courts have recognized two situations in which
plaintiffs who do not meet section 2-318's requirements may recover
economic losses caused by defective products. The first situation occurs where a non-privity plaintiff acquires the product through a
valid assignment of the original purchaser's sales contract. 10 5 The
second situation occurs where a non-privity plaintiff is a common
law third party beneficiary of the original buyer's contract. °( 6
104. UCC § 2-318, Alternative C is the only alternative presently available to
legislatures if they desire to have warranty protection extended to artificial persons (ie., corporations) which are not in the chain of distribution. See supra
note 68 for the text of that section. Similarly, Alternative C is the only alternative which extends protection to include solely economic damages.
105. In Illinois, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 26, para. 2-210(2) (1989) permits assignment of contracts for the sale of goods unless the parties to the original contract
have agreed otherwise. In 1988, the Illinois Supreme Court held that an assignee of an express warranty acquires privity of contract with the warrantor
and may thus sue for purely economic damages. Collins Co. v. Carboline Co.,
532 N.E.2d 834, 843 (Ill. 1988).
However, the Collins decision creates an anomaly which must be remedied.
It is entirely anomalous that a UCC warranty on a product would be extended
to a party if the product is transferred under a technical assignment, but not
extended to a party if the goods were received other than through an assignment. The only difference is the lack of payment for the transfer of the product
to the subsequent user. However, both parties have the same expectation that
the stated warranties or implied warranties will run to the non-privity plaintiff's benefit.
106. Several Illinois courts have held that one may recover purely economic
damages for breach of warranty under sales law if he is a common law third
party beneficiary of the original sales agreement. Crest Container Corp. v. R.H.
Bishop Co, 445 N.E.2d 19 (1982) (where manufacturer knew identity and needs
of consumer buyer, and manufactured goods in conformance, consumer could
sue manufacturer directly for economic losses); R & L Grain Co. v. Chicago
Eastern Corp., 531 F. Supp. 201, 208-209 (NDl. Ill.
1981) (plaintiff was common
law third party beneficiary of implied warranty of fitness and could recover
economic damages where manufacturer knew of plaintiff's intended use of
grain storage bin and knew that plaintiff relied on fitness of bin); Frank's Maintenance & Eng'r Inc. v. C. A. Roberts Co., 408 N.E2d 403,412 (IM.App. Ct. 1980)
(where manufacturer knew that product was intended for the plaintiff, and
manufacturer delivered goods directly to plaintiff, plaintiff was a common law
third party beneficiary and could recover economic losses); Rhodes Pharmacal
Co. v. Continental Can Co., 219 N.E.2d 726, 730-32 (Ill. App. Ct.1966) (plaintiff
was intended beneficiary of implied warranty of fitness and could, thus, recover
economic losses, notwithstanding UCC § 2-318, from manufacturer who knew
plaintiff's intended use of aerosol cans and knew that plaintiff relied on fitness
of the cans).
For a somewhat more restrictive view of the common law third party beneficiary exception to UCC § 2-318, see Altevogt v. Tom Brinkoetter & Co., 401
N.E.2d 1302, 1305 (IlM.App. Ct 1980) (holding that in order for the benefit of
implied warranty of habitability to run from third party to original seller, the
seller must also have actually known the identity of beneficiary). On this point,
the Altevogt court stated "[t]o extend third party beneficiary status on plaintiffs
we would have to be implying an intent to benefit them upon an agreement that
was itself implied." Id. See also Spiegel v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 466 N.E.2d 1040,
1044-45 (Ill. App. Ct.1984). See infranote 124 for an analysis of intended beneficiary status in sales of products.
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The cumulative result of the above sales and tort rules is that,
in Illinois, many persons, natural or artificial, in Illinois cannot sue
for economic damages under tort law. Additionally, they may do so
under sales law only if they were either the original purchaser, received the goods through a valid contractual assignment, or were an
intended beneficiary of the original purchaser's contract. Thus, the
following groups have no remedy whatsoever for solely economic
injury under any theory in Illinois if they have not directly contracted with the defendant: all of the groups listed in Illinois Commercial Code § 2-318, corporations, recipients of gifts, subsequent
07
purchasers other than assignees, and lessees.The reality is that many plaintiffs cannot avail themselves of
the UCC's "comprehensive scheme of remedies" because they are
not in privity with the defendants.'0 s Such a bizarre result makes it
necessary to provide an appropriate remedy for plaintiffs' economic
losses when the breach of a warranty invades their economic interests.'L 9 A plaintiff who has suffered only economic losses should
not be subject to a more rigorous privity requirement than one who
107. See Zanzig v. H.P.M. Corp., 480 N.E.2d 1204, 1211 (ill. App. Ct. 1985).
Lessees may become entitled to warranty protection in Illinois if the Illinois
Legislature adopts Article 2A of the UCC. See U.C.C. § 2A-216 (1990). However, unless the Illinois legislature adopts UCC § 2A-216, Alternative C, the
same result described in the text will occur with respect to lessees.
108. The Moorman Court asserted that the UCC remedies should govern
economic loss cases rather than requiring the seller to insure against the possibility that his product would injure a consumer. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National

Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 448 (Ill. 1982). Aside from the factual inaccuracy of
this proposition (i.e., sellers are free to disclaim warranties and limit remedies
for economic loss under UCC §§ 2-316 and 2-719), this view controverts the fundamental policy of implied warranties-that sellers should be held accountable
for the defects in their products.
109. Id. In Moorman, Illinois Supreme Court Justice Simon argued in a concurring opinion that "Itiheproperapproachis to develop a system of warranties
out ofprivity to protect warranty-like, that is contract-like, interests while us-

ing a tort theory to protect tort interests." Id. at 457 (Simon, J., specially concurring) (emphasis added). Justice Simon contended that when defective products
cause purely economic damages, privity of contract should not be a bar to a suit
for those damages under sales law. Id. This sound reasoning would mandate a

sweeping revision of Illinois Commercial Code § 2-318 to allow for such recovery. Richard E. Speidel, Warranty Theory, Economic Loss, and the Privity Requirement Once More Into the Void, 67 B.U.L. REV. 9, 35-57 (1987) (arguing in
favor of a limited form of strict warranty liability under the UCC to remove the
privity barrier in cases which present only economic losses). But see Professional Lens Plan, Inc. v. Polaris Leasing Corp., 675 P.2d 887, 898 (Kan. 1984)
(arguing that the privity barrier in warranty actions for economic loss could not
be lowered without creating several other problems in the operation of Article 2
of the UCC).
Neither the Illinois courts nor the Illinois legislature have created a remedy for this rather large class of non-privity plaintiffs to which the text, Professor Speidel, and Justice Simon refer. The lack of such a remedy may allow a
plaintiff to invoke the Illinois Constitution's provision which mandates the state
to provide a "certain remedy" for any injury to person, property, or reputation.
ILL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 12.
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has suffered personal injury.1 '
2. Non-DangerousDefects

A second major gap in Illinois products liability law is that
many non-privity plaintiffs cannot recover damages unless the
product is both defective and dangerous. As described above,"'
strict products liability in tort applies only where the product is
both defective and dangerous when it leaves the defendant's control." 2 Thus, a user or consumer of a defective, although non-dangerous, product 1 3 may not recover under tort law unless he is in
privity with the defendant. 4
Also, as described above, the Illinois Commercial Code limits
non-privity warranty plaintiffs to a narrow group of individuals
who may recover for personal injuries only."15 Thus, Illinois Commercial Code § 2-318 bars these plaintiffs' warranty actions unless
they are in a buyer's family or household, or are guests in his
home.- 6 Thus, in Illinois, many recipients of products who are not
110. SPEIDF_, supra note 70, pt. 3 at 32. The PEB study group stated that a

revision of UCC § 2-318 should impose upon a warranty plaintiff who suffered
economic loss the same privity requirement that a warranty plaintiff who suffers personal injury or property damage must meet. Id. See also Bertschy,
supra note 97, at 354-55 (1983) (noting that Illinois' economic loss doctrine in
strict products liability law leaves subsequent purchasers with substantially reduced remedies for economic losses).
111. See text accompanying supranotes 31-34 for a discussion of the requirements of a strict products liability cause of action.
112. It is critical to note that a strict products liability cause of action requires that a product be both defective and dangerous at the time it left the
defendant's control. See AMEICAN LAW OF PRODUC LIABnTY, supra note 4,
§ 18:34 at 40. However, an action for breach of warranty only requires that the
product be defective, and that defect need not be dangerous. Id. See also
William . Clement, Jr., Strict Liability and Warranty in Consumer Protection: The BroaderProtection of the UCC in Cases Involving Economic Loss,
Used Goods, and Non-dangerousDefective Goods, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347,
1358-59 (1982) (plaintiff "does not have to prove that the defective product is
dangerous" in a UCC warranty action).
113. The product's defective condition must be the source of its unreasonable
danger. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A cmt. i (1977). The very nature of some products makes them "unavoidably unsafe products" (e.g., vaccines, poisons, etc.). However, these products are not "unreasonably
dangerous" per se for purposes of strict products liability. Id. at cmt. k.
114. See, e.g., Fanning v. LeMay, 230 N.E.2d 182, 184 (IM. 1967) (non-privity
plaintiff barred from asserting strict products liability theory against manufacturer of shoes whose soles were highly slippery, although not "dangerous").
115. See supranotes 47-50 for a discussion of the scope of non-privity plaintiffs UCC warranties under UCC § 2-318, Alternative A.
116. These plaintiffs may be entitled to warranty protection, however, if
they are common law third party beneficiaries or have received the product
through a valid contractual assignment. See supra notes 105-06 for an explanation of these exceptions to Illinois Commercial Code § 2-318. Note that the
Whitaker Court added "employees" to the list in the text of Illinois Commercial Code § 2-318. See Whitaker v. Lian Feng Mach. Co., 509 N.E.2d 591, 595 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1987).
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in privity with the original seller, have no protection if thL? product
is merely defective, although not unreasonably dangerous.
Beneficiaries of UCC warranties deserve a remedy for injuries
caused by defective but non-dangerous products."i 7 These groups
may even have a state constitutional right to a remedy for such injury under the Illinois Constitution, which guarantees a certain
remedy for every violation of a right." 8 However, if plaintiffs do
not neatly fall within one of the UCC § 2-318, Alternative A classes
they will, at present, have no remedy under either tort or sales law.
Many non-privity plaintiffs are, therefore, currently denied a
cause of action under either strict products liability or under the
UCC warranty provisions for damages resulting from non-dangerous, but defective goods. Thus, the legislature should amend Illinois Commercial Code § 2-318 to permit a broader class of nonprivity plaintiffs to recover for damages caused by non-dangerous,
but defective goods. Such an amendment would ideally extend such
warranty protection to any ultimate user or consumer, privity
notwithstanding.

IV.

SOLUTIONS

Illinois needs a legislative remedy to solve the problems of judicial misconstruction of § 2-318 of non-dangerous defects cases, and
economic damages cases. This section first discusses three possible
solutions to the problem of judicial misconstruction of section 2-318
and the problem associated with many non-privity plaintiffs' inability to recover damages caused by non-dangerous defects. This section then discusses three potential solutions to the economic
damages problem.
There are three possible solutions to the problems of judicial
misconstruction of section § 2-318 and of non-recovery in non-dangerous defects cases. Each of these solutions engender a significant
expansion of the existing classes of third party beneficiaries in section 2-318. Expanding these classes will serve two fundamental policy concerns. One policy concern is the reconciliation of
inconsistencies between decisional law and the statutory language
117. See Clement, supra note 112, at 1358-59 (noting the inability of non-privity plaintiffs to sue for defective, although non-dangerous products). Cf. AMER.
ICAN LAW OF PRODUCT LIABILITY, supra note 4, § 18:32, at 37 (noting that strict
products liability is based upon the "defective" and "unreasonably dangerous"
status of a product, while warranty actions are based on diminished "utility" of
product).
118. ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 12 (1970). See supra note 109 for further discussion
regarding a possible constitutional violation.
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of Illinois Commercial Code § 2-318.11 9 The other policy concern is
the creation of a remedy for plaintiffs who justly deserve one. i 20
The first, and most limited, solution would be a legislative
amendment to Illinois Commercial Code § 2-318 to add "employees"
to the existing classes of third party beneficiaries under that section. 21 At present, the Illinois courts have added buyers' employees to section 2-318 through judicial fiat. 2 The Illinois legislature
should, at the very least, reflect this addition in the text of Illinois
Commercial Code § 2-318.23
The second solution would be a legislative amendment to extend warranty protection to any "ultimate user." Ultimate users
are the real beneficiaries of implied warranties, even though the
4
seller may not know the precise identity of the ultimate user.2
Thus, an amendment which adopts this broader third party benefi119. See supra notes 76-93 and accompanying text for an analysis of the present inconsistency between Illinois decisional law and Illinois Commercial Code

§ 2-318.

120. A recent judicial trend towards expanding Illinois Commercial Code
§ 2-318 classes emphasizes the fact that providing a remedy to many plaintiffs
whose expectational interests are violated when sellers breach their express
and implied warranties is a valid policy concern. See Wheeler v. Sunbelt Tool
Co., 537 N.E.2d 1332, 1339-41 (I App. Ct.) (Illinois Commercial Code § 2-318
expanded to include employees), appeal denied, 545 N.E.2d 134 (1989); Whitaker v. Lian Feng Mach. Co., 509 N.E.2d 591, 594-95 (IMI. App. Ct. 1987) (Illinois
Commercial Code § 2-318 permitted employee to recover for seller's breach of
plaintiff's employer's warranty); Boddie v. Litton Unit Handling Sys., 455
N.E.2d 142,151 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (ultimate buyer's employees included); Knox
v. North Am. Car Co., 399 N.E.2d 1355, 1359-60, (Ill.
App. Ct.) (in dicta, buyer's
employee within scope of Illinois Commercial Code § 2-318 as he was the "functional equivalent" of guest or family member), overruledin partby Whitaker v.
Lian Feng Mach. Co., 509 N.E.2d 591, 594 (1987). The Boddie Court boldly
stated that "third party beneficiary status can and should be expanded to include employees of ultimate purchasers even under the restrictive section 2-318
adopted in Illinois." Boddie, 455 N.E.2d at 151.
12L The three statutory classes of third party beneficiaries to UCC warranties which presently exist in Illinois are the original buyer's family, household,
and guests in his home. ILL REv. STAT. ch. 26, para. 2-318 (1961).
122. See supra note 120 for a summary of the Illinois cases responsible for
extending Illinois Commercial Code § 2-318 to include "buyers' employees."
123. Florida has chosen to amend UCC § 2-318 in this manner. FLA. STAT.
ch. 672.318 (1967 & Supp. 1990). The Florida amendment to UCC § 2-318 adds
"employees," "servants," and "agents" of the buyer to the standard classes of
third party beneficiaries already in Alternative A. Id.
124. See supra note 106 for a compilation of Illinois law with respect to the
treatment of common law third party beneficiaries in products liability law. The
"ultimate user" is an intended, or at least contemplated, beneficiary of implied
warranties in the original sale of a product. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts offers significant support for this proposition.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302 provides that "a beneficiary
of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance
is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and ... the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of

the promised performance."

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302

(1979). Not surprisingly, the Restatement specifically notes that section 302 in-
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ciary class would be consistent with recent case law interpreting Illinois Commercial Code § 2-318.125 This solution would also reduce
the arbitrary lines which Illinois Commercial Code § 2-318 draws
between a buyer's family, household and guests in his home, and
other classes of ultimate users of the product.?
Further, this
amendment would give statutory recognition to, and thus legitimize, Illinois' divergent trend with respect to "employees" under
cludes the classifications noted in UCC § 2-318. REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
CONTRACTS § 302, cnt. d, illus. 15 (1979).
Once an individual falls within the section 302 class of intended beneficiaries, a duty arises in the promisor to perform his promise for the benefit of
the beneficiary. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (1979). The intended beneficiary also has a right to enforce the promise directly against the
promisor. Id. Of particular note, the Restatement does not require that an intended beneficiary be identified at the time of contracting to qualify as an intended beneficiary. § 308. Thus, to summarize, the Restatement takes the
position that one is a third party beneficiary of a contract where it appears that
the parties to the contract intended the benefit of the contract to run to the
beneficiary even though he has not been specifically identified.
This concept is likewise applicable in the context of UCC express and implied warranties by analogy, or through the use of UCC § 1-103, which introduces into the UCC principles of common law which the UCC has not
superceded. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 26, para. 1-103 (1961). For example, a
seller's implied promise that the goods are "merchantable" is essentially a
promise which the seller makes to the ultimate user or consumer of goods. C.
Richard E. Speidel, Warranty Theory, Economic Loss, and the Privity Requirement. Once More Into the Void, 67 B.U. L.REV. 9, 42-44 (1987) (arguing that
UCC warranty provisions may be interpreted to extend implied warranties to
foreseeable purchasers). One New York court commented on the reach of implied warranties to ultimate users, and stated that "interpretat .:n of the implied warranty rule [was] that an obligation is imposed by law upon one who
impels the wrong and that the ultimate consume-r... has a cause of action

against the violator privity notwithstanding." Welch v. Schiebelhuth, 169
N.Y.S.2d 309, 314 (1957) (emphasis added). Anyone who intimates that the ultimae user is not an intended beneficiary of the premise of merchant-ability is
guilty of: 1) ignoring the reality of modern product distribution, 2) exalting the
formalistic and irrelevant specific identification of the third party beneficiary
over the substance of transactions in consumer goods, and 3) denying consumers an adequate remedy against profiters who dump their defective products on
the public while insulating themselves from liability with a multi-level distribution scheme. Cf.Moorman Mg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 457
(Ill.
1982) (Simon, J., specially concurring).
Thus, the implied warranties of the UCC should extend to the ultimate
user through an amended version of UCC § 2-318 which removes the privity
barrier to "ultimate users." These individuals are the ones whom the parties to
the contract impliedly intended the ultimate benefit of the warranties to attach
and protect. Such a revision would be, in essence, analogous to the formulation
used in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRnTS § 402A (1967). That section allows
"users or consumers" to bring suit under strict products liability theories
notwithstanding any notion of privity of contract. Id.
125. See supra note 120 for a summary of Illinois cases indicating this intent.
126. The arbitrary nature of the third party beneficiary classes in UCC § 2318, Alternative A becomes more clear when, for some reason, the court cannot
allow a strict products liability count (e.g., where the product is defective, but
not dangerous, where plaintiff seeks only economic damages, where the tort
statute of limitations has run, etc.). One Illinois case illustrates the stark injustice of the arbitrary lines which UCC § 2-318 draws between buyers' family,
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the Illinois Commercial Code.127
The third way in which the legislature could remedy the
courts' misconstruction of Illinois Commercial Code § 2-318 and the
non-dangerous defect problem would be to adopt the type of third
party beneficiary classes identified in UCC § 2-318, Alternatives B
and C.128 Those formulations extend warranty protection to nonprivity plaintiffs who "may reasonably be expected to use, consume
or be affected by the goods."'29 Doing so would give courts express
permission to make determinations as to the appropriate reach of
UCC warranties to non-privity plaintiffs beyond the original buyer.
However, such an amendment may have a broader reach than recent Illinois cases interpreting Illinois Commercial Code § 2-318.130
The Illinois legislature must also remedy the economic damages problem. Like the preceding section, the following set of potential solutions would significantly expand the ability of nonprivity plaintiffs to recover economic damages.13 1 These solutions
would serve the important policy concern of providing a meaningful
remedy for deserving consumers who currently have no remedy
under Illinois law.' 32 There are three ways in which Illinois could
achieve this result.
household, or guests in his household, and individuals who do not fit those
classes. See Hemphill v. Sayers, 552 F. Supp. 685 (S.D. IMI. 1982).
In Hemphill, a football player was injured when a defect in his helmet allegedly caused severe injury to his cervical spine. Id. at 685-86. The football
player sued various school officials and the manufacturer of the helmet on negligence, implied warranty, and strict products liability counts. Id. at 687. The
court dismissed the strict products liability counts for various reasons. I&
When the court addressed implied warranty counts, it simply dismissed them
on the ground that the plaintiff could not recover since he did not fit neatly

within an Illinois Commercial Code § 2-318 class. Id. at 690-93. Thus, plaintiff's
entire cause of action was left to the possibility that he might be able to recover
on a single negligence count which the court granted him leave to refile. Id. at
694. Although the court was correct in adhering to the language and intent of
Illinois Commercial Code § 2-318, the result of the court's proper application of

that statute was unquestionably a bitter one for the plaintiff.
127. Maryland has followed this suggestion and has amended and expanded
the classes of beneficiaries under § 2-318, Alternative A to include the "ultimate
user or consumer" of the goods or persons whom the goods affect. MD. COMMERCIAL CODE ANN. § 2-318 (1975).
128. See supra notes 67-68 for the full texts of UCC § 2-318, Alternatives B
and C.
129. U.C.C. § 2-318, Alternatives B, C (1990).
130. At present, Illinois courts have only expanded Illinois Commercial Code
§ 2-318 by including "employees".

See supra note 120 for the cases which

broaden the scope of Illinois Commercial Code § 2-318.
131. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text for the definition of economic damages, and see supra notes 94-110 and accompanying text for an examination of the economic damage problem in Illinois products liability law.
132. See supra notes 94-110 and accompanying text for an analysis of the
non-privity plaintiffs' inability to recover economic damages under Illinois'
products liability law.
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First, Illinois could recognize the recovery of purely economic
damages in strict products liability actions.1 33 However, doing so
would cut against the trend in modern strict products liability law
toward barring recovery of purely economic damages.'34 Thus, judicial alteration of this settled rule is unlikely, since Illinois is
firmly entrenched in its belief that sales law should govern claims
for purely economic damages:1 s
The second solution would require the Illinois legislature to revise section § 2-318, Alternative A, which currently extends warranty protection to third party beneficiaries who seek recovery for
personal injury only.'6 This revision would require the removal of
the words "in person" which follow the word "injured." This revision would effectively permit a non-privity plaintiff to recover direct and consequential economic damages under the UCC warranty
provisions.'3 7 This revision would preserve most of the present
structure of section 2-318, yet would effectively fill a considerable
138
portion of the economic damages gap.
The third solution to the economic damages problem would be
Illinois' adoption of UCC § 2-318, Alternative C.13 9 That section expressly permits any reasonably foreseeable plaintiff to recover for
any injury which was proximately caused by a breach of war133. Allowing a plaintiff to recover solely economic damages in strict product liability actions would require a reversal of Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National
Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443 (. 1982). A minority of jurisdictions have permitted
recovery of purely economic losses under strict products liability theory. See,
e.g., Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305, 310 (N.J. 1965) (permitting plaintiff's suit for recovery of economic losses against manufacturer under
implied warranty theory, despite a lack of privity); LaCrosse v. Schubert,
Schroeder & Assoc., 240 N.W.2d 124, 127 (Wis. 1976) (recognizing recovery of
purely economic losses in strict products liability).
134. See, e.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 150-51 (Cal. 1965) (refusing to allow a strict products liability cause of action where plaintiff alleged
only economic damages); Moor-man, 435 N.E.2d at 445-49 (Illinois court holding
that economic losses should be recoverable under contract, not tort law).
135. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Illinois courts' entrenchment in their belief that sales law must control suits for
solely economic damages.
136. See supra note 50 for the full text of UCC § 2-318, Alternative A.
137. Several states have omitted the words "in person" from its versions of
UCC § 2-318, thus indicating that the requisite "injury" can include injury to a
person, his property, or his economic interests. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2318 (1974); S.D. CODIMED LAWS ANN. § 57A-2-31S (1988); WYo. STAT. § 34.1-2318 (1991).
138. Note, however, that the changes proposed in the text would extend warranty protection for purely economic loss only to the third party beneficiary
classes provided in Illinois Commercial Code § 2-318. In order to completely fill
the economic damages "gap" it would be necessary to both expand the classes of
third party beneficiaries and remove the words "in person" following "injured"
in Illinois Commercial Code § 2-318.
139. See supra note 68 for the full text of UCC § 2-318, Alternative C.
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ranty.140 The Illinois legislature's adoption of UCC § 2-318, Alternative C would unambiguously give plaintiffs a remedy for purely
economic injuries in sales law where the Illinois courts have demanded that it remain. 14 This appears to be the most complete
solution since it would resolve the problem of judicial misconstruction of section 2-318, the problem of non-recovery in non-dangerous
defects cases, and the problem of non-privity plaintiffs' inability to
recover economic damages.
To summarize, the basic solutions which this section proposes
should serve as the framework for the Illinois legislature's revision

of Illinois Commercial Code § 2-318. Fundamentally, the revisions
should create a broadened class of third party beneficiaries who
may recover for both non-economic and economic losses under a
UCC breach of warranty theory.142 If the Illinois legislature
chooses to make such a revision, Illinois products liability law as a
whole will be more cohesive and the antiquated concept of privity
in products liability law will be one step closer to extinction.
140. See U.C.C. § 2-318, Alternative A (1990).
141. See Kishwaukee Community Health v. Hospital Bldg. and Equip. Co.,
638 F. Supp. 1492, 1502 (N.D. Il. 1986) (noting the strong Illinois policy that
contract law alone governs warranty actions which allege only economic damages); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 448 (I. 1982)
(holding that sales law provides warranty plaintiffs with their sole remedy
when they allege only economic loss).
142. Based on the potential solutions stated in the text, a possible rewritten
Illinois Commercial Code § 2-318 might appear as follows:
A seller's warranty, whenever express or implied, shall extend to any
person, natural or artificial, who is an ultimate user or consumer of the
warranted goods and who is injured by a breach of the warranty. For the
purposes of this section no distinction shall be made between injury to the
person, injury to property, and direct or consequential economic injury. A
seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
The Illinois legislature should not fear deviating from or even rewriting
UCC § 2-318 since doing so will ultimately serve Illinois' public interests. In
fact, the PEB has even stated that "Section 2-318, which has been non-uniformly amended in a number of states and entirely omitted in California and
Utah, is a section not requiring uniformity throughout all American jurisdictions." AMERICAN LAW INST. & NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: 1972 OFFICiAL TEXT xxvii
(1972) (from '"Report No. 3 of the Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform
Commercial Code").
The Massachusetts version of UCC § 2-318 is another prime example of a
state legislature's unilateral variation of that section to fulfill its state policy

concerns:
Lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant shall be no defense in any
action brought against the manufacturer, seller, lessor, or supplier of goods
to recover damages for breach of warranty, express or implied, or for negligence, although the plaintiff did not purchase the goods from the defendant
if the plaintiff was a person whom the manufacturer, seller, lessor or supplier might reasonably have expected to use, consume or be affected by the
goods.
MAss. GEN LAws. ANN. ch. 11, § 2-318 (West 1990).
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CONCLUSION

This comment illustrates the necessity for a major revision of
Illinois Commercial Code § 2-318. The Illinois legislature should revise that section, keeping in mind the recent judicial misinterpretation of § 2-318, the existing gaps in products liability law, and public
policy concerns., The revised version should expand the classes of
third party beneficiaries and should expand the recoverable damages to include personal injury, property damage, and direct and
consequential economic losses. Illinois could achieve the same results by adopting UCC § 2-318, Alternative C.
Steven Bonanno

